Introduction
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code ("UCCC") commenced operation on 1 November 1996 under an inter-governmental agreement, and now operates in all States and Territories of Australia. Pursuant to section 6 of the UCCC, it applies to the provision of credit to a natural person where the credit is provided wholly or predominantly for personal, household or domestic purposes; where a charge is made for providing the credit; and where the credit is provided in the course of a business providing credit or as part of or incidental to any other business of the credit provider. The UCCC seeks to protect consumers in two key ways: through disclosure requirements and through what we refer to as 'safety net provisions' which operate in the event that a consumer's circumstances change or disclosure and competition have not provided adequate consumer protection.
In this article we will explore the limitations of these forms of consumer protection, particularly in the We define a 'low income consumer' to include people who are financially excluded from access to mainstream credit on the basis of income. Financial exclusion in the Australian context has been defined as:
The lack of access by certain consumers to appropriate low cost, fair and safe financial products and services from mainstream providers (Chant Link and Associates 2004, p. 58) .
In Australia, where only 0.08% of the Australian adult population own no financial products, but where 6% own only a transaction product and therefore no credit products (Chant Link and Associates 2004, p. 120) , lack of access to safe and affordable short-term, small amount credit is central to the question of financial exclusion (Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006) . Some definitions of low income Australians are likely to set the bar too low to include those who are financially excluded on the basis of income.
For example, a single person with no dependants is regarded as a low income earner where he or she earns a gross annual income of no more than AUD$22,620, according to Australian government welfare agency, Centrelink (Centrelink 2008) . The Australian Bureau of Statistics figures confirm that people at this income level experience the highest level of financial stress in the community and are likely to be unable to raise $2000 in a week for something important (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007) . It is possible, however, that people earning above that amount would be excluded from mainstream credit primarily on income grounds, when their application is processed under a mainstream credit provider's credit scoring model. Unfortunately credit scoring models are not made freely available by mainstream credit providers so it is difficult to verify this. Nevertheless, a low income consumer will be regarded for the purposes of this article as a person defined by government a low income earner or who is or would be denied access to mainstream credit on the basis of income alone.
Those who were interviewed for the purpose of this research fall within our definition of low income Australian. They were predominantly renters of public housing, receiving income support payments and not in the workforce. 63% of them had had transactional accounts only (and therefore no credit products) prior to taking out the loan under discussion in this research. Of the 30 interviewees, 22 had recently signed a credit contract as participants of low interest, community loans programs, and 8 had recently obtained credit from a fringe lender, meaning that they had accessed high cost credit from outside the 'mainstream' credit market (see discussion in Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006).
The research was qualitative in nature and given the sample size it is not possible to generalise that the views expressed are representative of all low income consumers, nor can the results be analysed statistically. However, this research method was chosen because it gave the opportunity to 'understand the world as seen by the respondents' (Patton 1990, p. 24) . It provided a small number of information rich interviews which are at least indicative of the views and experiences of low income borrowers.
The 22 community loans recipients took part in interviews which focused on their understanding of information disclosed in the contract (see discussion guide, annexure 1). They were also asked to reflect on the paperwork in general, their rights and responsibilities and the most important aspects of the contract, and were presented with a one-page summary of the contract and asked for their opinions on it (see short form personal loan contract, annexure 2).
The 8 fringe credit recipients took part in interviews which focused on hypothetical unfair contract terms (see discussion guide, annexure 3). They were also asked for responses to extracts from a mock contract containing terms that consumer groups have considered unfair, in the sense of being unreasonably disadvantageous to the consumer (see mock contract, annexure 4) (Australian Limitations of the research methodology which should be noted are firstly that some interviewees had existing or previous relationships with the Brotherhood of St Laurence which may have influenced their responses, although loans officers took no part in the interviews. To minimise this risk it was emphasised that the loans would proceed regardless of their comments and that there were no right or wrong answers. It was also stressed that their comments were confidential and would have no impact on future loan applications. Secondly, there was a risk that participants would overstate their understanding of the credit contract to avoid feeling like a failure. This was overcome by extensive piloting of the interview discussion guides so that the interview would seem quite informal and participants would feel that any opinions would be accepted in a non-judgmental way. Thirdly, the discussion about low-income people's propensity to sign contracts including unfair terms was hypothetical. There is likely to have been a bias towards people saying that they would not sign a contract with unfair terms but then behaving differently in a desperate situation. As a result, the research focused on interviewee's opinions on clauses within the contract, rather than views as to whether they would proceed with the loan. The research also focused on participants' understandings of their rights and inclination to pursue rights, for example through seeking legal advice or commencing court proceedings. Finally, this research focused on one component of the mandated disclosure under the UCCC, namely the pre-contractual statement required by section 14 which in most cases is comprised of the proposed contract document. This research did not examine other forms of disclosure required by the UCCC, including statements of account and other notices and warnings.
In this article we will consider the literature on disclosure regulation and its effectiveness and then draw on the qualitative interview data to draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of disclosure as a means of protecting vulnerable, low income Australians. Qualitative interview data was analysed to ensure quotes were representative of the sample and findings were not dominated by any one participant. We will then consider the literature concerning the effectiveness of safety net provisions such as hardship provisions and an ability to re-open unjust transactions. Included in this will be a discussion on the effectiveness of consumer protections more generally which rely on consumers to initiate litigation, and the consequences of the lack of an unfair contract terms regime. Again, we will then draw on the qualitative interview data to assess the effectiveness of current measures in protecting vulnerable low income Australians. In our conclusion we will make four key recommendations for regulatory reform in Australia to better protect those consumers.
Part One-Disclosure

Disclosure under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
The key principle informing the UCCC is "truth in lending," derived from the US Truth in Lending Act 1968. The declared purpose of the Truth in Lending Act was to ensure the meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that consumers would be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to them, and to avoid the uninformed use of credit (Kofele-Kale 1984, p. 120) . The theory has been that 'credit cost disclosure' causing greater information in the hands of consumers, 'necessarily leads to informed consumer choice in the credit market place' (Kofele-Kale 1984, p. 117) .
The explanatory memorandum to the UCCC explained 'truth in lending' as a concept by which consumers can make informed choices between credit products taking into account the nature of the credit being offered and comparative costs between credit providers. Disclosure was regarded as important to achieving this, and pursuant to sections 14 and 15 of the UCCC the disclosure of a range of information is required to be made to a borrower before a credit contract is entered into. Both the pre-contractual statement (often just a copy of the credit contract provided before the contract is entered into) and the credit contract itself are required to set out such information as the amount of credit, annual percentage interest rates and how they will be calculated, repayments, whether interest and credit fees and charges can be changed, frequency of statements of account, enforcement expenses payable on breach, whether any commission is payable, whether there is any security being taken, and details of any security and insurance. Breach of section 15 is deemed to be a breach of a 'key requirement' under section 100, carrying with it the possibility of a civil penalty order of up to $500,000. Situating disclosure as a key requirement under the UCCC carrying with it the possibility of a heavy penalty for breach, demonstrates the central nature of disclosure in the UCCC as a consumer protection mechanism. This can be compared with penalties such as $11,000 for breach of advertising requirements under section 140, harassment under section 145 or canvassing of credit at home under section 146; or $5,500 for false or misleading representations under section 144.
The problems with disclosure regulation
As Cartwright notes, disclosure regulation is a 'relatively 'pro-market' regulatory response because it facilitates the consumer's making of an informed choice' (Cartwright 2004, p. 62) . It is said to perfect imperfect markets by addressing information asymmetries. With perfect information, consumers will be able to make 'perfect', rational choices thus enhancing the efficiency of the market. By ensuring the provision of information to consumers it is theorised that: …consumers can protect their own interest by selecting the goods or services closest to their own preferences. Harm will be reduced by ensuring goods and services are more likely to be in line with realistic consumer expectations based on reliable information (Howells 2005, p. 
355).
The emphasis is very much on consumers being able to protect themselves, which might be seen as evidence of the phenomenon referred to by Ramsay as the 'responsibilisation' of the consumer:
…where governments are investing heavily in projects to ensure that individuals become responsible consumers through the use of information, the development of financial capability, and financial literacy programs (Ramsay 2006, p. 13) .
One must ask whether it is realistic to expect all consumers to protect themselves and manage their own risks on the basis that they have been provided with relevant information. One major criticism of disclosure regulation is that it is based on an 'unrealistic, rational actor model of borrower behaviour' (Willis 2006, p. 741) .
Much of the literature on disclosure regulation suggests that this form of regulation is likely to be of the least benefit to low income, vulnerable consumers. As long ago as 1976, Day wrote that:
Information disclosure requirements have been aptly described as protection for the middle class. Low income buyers, who have the greatest need for protection or assistance in making more informed choices, are more likely to lack the characteristics that will allow them to take advantage of the information (Day 1976, p. 49) .
Where low income consumers are in desperate need of credit and regard themselves as having little choice in terms of credit products available to them, they are unlikely to take any disclosed information into account in entering into a credit contract. As Howells has noted:
Information is only useful if it can be acted upon. The poor may rationally decide not to make use of information, if they feel no alternatives will be available to them (Howells 2005, p. 
357).
A study conducted in Australia in 1999 supports a view that people on low incomes will not benefit from the provision of information to them when entering into a credit contract, because of their lack of choice. It was reported that:
Most low income participants stated that their main priority when seeking credit is finding out the credit providers who were prepared to provide them credit. Many said they were unable to get credit from most places…Respondents on low incomes reported that their choice of lender was determined by the lender who was prepared to lend them the money…For some they had no choice but to borrow from a lender who they knew charged high interest rates. Thus choice of lender tended to be determined by a lack of bargaining power rather than ignorance of what loans were on offer (Malbon 1999, p. 78 ).
Howells also refers to disclosure as a 'middle class tool' in that:
Those who take advantage of information are likely to be the more affluent, well-educated middle-class consumers. Evidence from studies of consumer credit disclosure rules suggests that it is better-off consumers who tend to make use of information (Howells 2005, p. 357) .
As a result there is an argument that reliance on disclosure regulation can exacerbate social inequity.
Wilhelmsson argues that:
Information measures are neutral as to their recipients, which in practice means an advantage for the consumers who are well-equipped to use the information. In this sense, therefore, measures based on the information paradigm may reproduce and even strengthen existing social injustice (Wilhelmsson 1997, p. 224) .
The complexity and volume of information disclosed is also open to criticism. It has been found that consumers have a limited ability to understand and process information.
The human mind handles data by breaking it down into manageable chunks. It has been estimated that roughly seven chunks of information is the most the human mind can handle at any one time (Howells 2005, p. 360) .
While comprehension levels may be higher among middle class consumers, the inability to cope with large amounts of information might render disclosure a somewhat ineffective regulatory tool even in terms of protecting middle class consumers. The 1999 Australian study referred to above involved a national telephone poll of 1600 consumers who had borrowed under the UCCC, as well as 6 focus groups conduced in Melbourne and Brisbane. Those polled and interviewed came from a range of socio-economic backgrounds and comprehension levels were reportedly good overall. There were shown to be some overall benefits experienced by consumers in receiving information about credit products, but there were a number of complaints about such things as complexity and repetitiveness of the information provided. (Malbon 1999) The telephone poll revealed that 88% of those entering a personal loan contract read the pre-contractual loan information before signing and 51% said that the information was helpful in that it clarified the terms of the loan into which they were entering. (Malbon 1999, pp. 67 & 68) The focus group results painted a less positive picture.
Whilst some participants carefully read the information provided to them, a number found it difficult to use. The complaints about the information included that it was "beyond comprehension", "needs to be simpler, in layman's terms", "is repetitive and boring". Several participants made the point that they had to rely on the bank manager or service officer to explain the loan terms, and that they had to accept their explanation of trust. "I only took in half of what they were saying. I was going to sign anyway, what difference does it make?" (Malbon 1999, p.71) Other research conducted at the University of Queensland in 2005 used four different types of contracts, including a consumer credit contract. 215 participants, who were predominantly university students, with an average age of 20, presumably literate and intelligent and therefore giving rise to an "elite bias" in the study, were given the contracts to read. There is also the crucial consideration of borrowers' literacy levels. The Deputy Chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has noted that '46 per cent of Australians can't read well enough to understand financial disclosure documents' (Cooper 2008, p. 2) .
What our research shows: Does disclosure help consumers?
Understanding important terms
The comments made by interviewees generally contradicted the fundamental assumption of the UCCC that disclosure of information assists borrowers in making an informed choice about signing a credit contract. The interviewees felt overwhelmed by the length of the contracts and the language used, particularly given that many of the participants had not finished school and had a limited understanding of the language used in contracts. They've got a hell of a lot of pages here. There's about maybe 20 pages here, maybe more.
I'm not sure why they have such a big, thick paper. But I think the [financial institution] could make it a little bit more briefer than that for people.
What they need to do is they need to go over the contract again and maybe word it better for people who are not [educated]-see I've only done Year 10, and I think that's my failing, where I've gone and signed the contract and I couldn't understand a lot of what was being said. It blurred: I see all these words…I think they need to go back and re-word it and maybe put it in more plainer English.
They should keep it just basic and one or two pages with simple words on it than something really complicated that you can't read…Why send out a contract for you to sign and end up having pages and pages of it to deal with? I think more it's to cover their backside really…But it's your risk.
The interviewees did understand their obligation to repay the loan, although that understanding was derived not from the contract but rather from their own sense of an unwritten contract along the lines of "I promise not to default". For those borrowing from fringe lenders, most knew that the charges were high and were very clear on the tangible impact of these repayments on their budget.
You end up paying about $190 something on a $100 loan. That is a lot of money.
While this participant was clear that she was paying a total of $90 in interest, she later explained that she did not understand how this was represented as an interest rate.
I don't know about interest rates…Because I've never had anything to do with interest rates and calculating interest and all that. Their interest rate is absolutely shocking.
In addition to not understanding interest rate calculations, interviewees did not understand the consequences of not repaying the loan, often operating under misconceptions that the lender had far more rights than it in fact did. One misconception was that if a borrower defaulted, the lender could automatically pursue their next of kin, even in the absence of any contractual liability on the part of the next of kin, for example through a guarantee having been signed.
[The financial institution] would make an application for the next of kin or something like that, for the default. I don't know really myself.
There was also a misconception that the lender could seize the borrower's property, notwithstanding the absence of any security having been taken at law.
If we fall behind, they've got the right to come and repossess or take legal action against you…They've got all the rights to come out and repossess some of your furniture.
These misconceptions suggest that consumers are vulnerable to the risk that a lender could assert such rights without challenge by the borrower.
Interestingly, when presented with the short form one page contract (see annexure 2) some interviewees did grasp the meaning of some important terms and responded to them, for example the clause accelerating the obligation to repay the loan in full in the event of default.
If you fail to make a payment-Oh my god! This is not a contract, this is signing your life over…No thank you! This suggests that the provision of a shorter form contract with only the most essential terms outlined, may make disclosure requirements more effective, even for low income or otherwise vulnerable consumers.
Impact of a lack of choice
The primary reason for low income interviewees signing contracts without fully understanding them was that they realised their options were limited. Research by the Brotherhood of St Laurence suggested many low income people do not have a network of family and friends to help them in difficult times. Even if they do have a network of family and friends, these people are often on low incomes themselves and only have a limited capacity to assist. This research also indicated that many low income people saw there was more dignity and convenience in obtaining a loan rather than going without, going to an opportunity shop or obtaining emergency relief. Although recipients of a government payment are able to obtain one $500 advance each year, anecdotal evidence suggests that many re-apply for their advance as soon as they are eligible, so it is less likely to be available when unexpected expenses arise. (Scutella and Sheehan, 2006) Those who borrowed from fringe lenders felt desperate for money and realised that their choice was constrained by the realities of the market for credit. The contract seemed less relevant for those borrowers as there were no alternatives if they disagreed with the contractual terms and conditions. I've got a lot of reservations with the loan, and I've explored other options, but the pension doesn't count as an income [to banks] so we're stuck in the mud-hole at the moment.
Interviewees understood that given their desperation for credit, they were left with no choice but to accept onerous conditions. I felt I was being railroaded, but I was desperate for a car-I was a single woman, they could see the desperation in my eyes as soon as I walked into that car lot.
Interviewees also expressed a degree of powerlessness in their dealings with the lender.
I didn't really understand much of it…It was very quick. He just said, 'Sign", so I signed and that was it. He didn't explain anything, nothing.
I've signed, I have to take it, I have to cop it, there's no problem-but what can I do? I just have to try to pay it and do whatever's got to be done.
The interviews demonstrated the particular limitations of disclosure where borrowers felt that they had no choice in accessing credit. It was very much a case of accessing credit from wherever you could, on whatever terms were offered.
Part Two-Safety net provisions
Although disclosure regulation is a primary focus of the UCCC, the Code also includes a number of provisions that focus on issues other than disclosure. In this paper, we focus on the provisions of the UCCC that give consumers the opportunity to vary a credit contract on the grounds of hardship (sections 66 and 68), to challenge a contract on the grounds that it is unjust (sections 70 and 71), and to dispute certain fees and charges in interest rates on the grounds that they are unconscionable (section 72). These provisions give additional consumer protections where consumers are disadvantaged, despite disclosure and/or a competitive market; or where consumers' financial or other circumstances change after a credit contract is entered into, such that the original obligations become impossible to meet. We have therefore characterised these provisions as 'safety net' provisions.
While these safety net provisions are generally available to all consumers, it is often assumed that these safety net provisions will be of most assistance to consumers who are on low incomes or otherwise disadvantaged.
In relation to the hardship provisions, this assumption is manifest in the fact that the provisions are only available where the loan is below a specified amount (calculated by reference to average home prices in New South Wales, and changing over time). However, as we discuss below, the practical barriers to accessing these provisions may be much higher for low income consumers than other consumers.
Despite the existence of these provisions for a number of years, and the existence of similar provisions This contrasts with greater levels of research on the effectiveness of disclosure regulation. To the extent that there is such discussion of 'safety net' provisions, it is largely in the nature of policy research and commentary, released by advocates and/or government agencies, rather than academic literature or extensive empirical work.
The problems with the safety net provisions
The importance of a competitive consumer credit market is emphasised in the explanatory material for the UCCC, and this is facilitated by information disclosure. However, the policy of the legislation is also to 'to provide significant redress mechanisms for borrowers in the event that credit providers fail to comply with the legislation' (KPMG Consulting 2000, p. 69).
In their review of the objectives of the UCCC, KMPG Consulting observed:
Even if prices are generally efficient, there still exists the opportunity for unscrupulous credit providers to take advantage of some debtors. Hence, it is appropriate to provide redress mechanisms to deter this type of activity (KPMG Consulting 2000, p. 71).
In contrast with disclosure regulation, the safety net provisions cannot easily be characterised as a 'promarket' regulatory approach. Instead, they are more accurately characterised as, in Sylvan's classification, 'rules to protect consumers from inappropriate behaviour of traders' (Sylvan 2004, p. 194) . The existence of these provisions acknowledges that, even in competitive markets, consumers can be subject to practices or transactions that are considered unacceptable by the community.
Cartwright describes provisions that allow consumers to take action on the basis of unfairness as 'opentexture rules' (Cartwright 2004, p. 152) . These rules allow the courts to consider a wide variety of factors before deciding whether the terms, transaction, or conduct offends the legal standard (Cartwright 2004, p. 169) . This description applies equally to provisions to provide a remedy for conduct or transactions that are unjust or unconscionable, as in the UCCC.
Given their 'open-texture' nature, the safety net provisions in the UCCC are not necessarily consistent with commercial and contractual certainty. They provide grounds for vitiating a contract that, on its face, appears to have been voluntarily entered into by both parties. In light of this, when considering the public interest as one of the factors in a decision under the open-texture rules in the UCCC and other legislation, the courts often 'consider the relevance of the public interest that parties should generally be kept to agreements entered between them' (Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon "Mikhail Lermontov"). 1 From a consumer perspective, the effectiveness of the safety net provisions has been criticised by reference to both the scope of the provisions, and the requirement that consumers must initiate action in order to activate the protection offered by the provisions. This last issue has particular import for vulnerable low income consumers. Although they are linked, we will outline some of the key criticisms on the scope of the individual provisions first, and then discuss the generally applicable criticism in relation to enforcement.
The scope and framing of the provisions
Section 66(1) of the UCCC permits a debtor to apply to the credit provider for a change to a credit contract if the debtor is 'unable reasonably, because of illness, unemployment or other reasonable cause, to meet the debtor's obligations under a credit contract'. Section 66(2) sets out the types of changes that can be made (essentially extending the term of the contract and/or postponing payments for a specified period). If a credit provider refuses to make the requested change, the debtor can apply to a Court to change the terms of the credit contract under section 68.
Originally these provisions could not be used for credit transactions of more than $125,000. However, Section 70 of the UCCC gives the court, on the application of a debtor, mortgagor, or guarantor, the power to re-open a transaction that gave rise to an unjust contract, mortgage or guarantee. Section 70(2) provides a list of factors that the court can take into account in determining whether a contract term is unjust, and also directs the court to consider the public interest and all of the circumstances in the case. Section 71 details the orders that the court can make if it reopens a transaction; these include orders setting aside or revising or altering a contract, and orders relieving the debtor and any guarantor of any amounts not reasonably payable.
The primary criticism of s 70 relates to the broad nature of the provision, where the provision of a list of factors that can be taken into account is said to create uncertainty for both consumers and businesses. For example, Carlin (in relation to similar provision in the Contracts Review Act) notes:
While a list of indicia is provided by the Act, no instruction is provided in relation to the weighting of these factors by courts when reaching decisions as to injustice. This means that decision in which a contract is found to be unjust may have very little precedential value because they reflect one court's predilections at a particular point in time rather than the result of a standardised process of consideration (Carlin 2001, pp 136-137) .
Critics have also suggested that s 70 fails, in application, to provide relief for substantive injustice in the absence of procedural irregularities (Howell 2006, p. 463; Niven and Gough 2004, p. 25 ). An emphasis on procedural injustice, rather than substantive injustice, necessitates an examination of individual circumstances, and thus also reduces the potential for the development of precedent and widespread change in business practice.
Other criticisms are that s 70 is reactive, rather than proactive, and does not provide an effective remedy for consumer credit overcommitment, despite the fact that s 70(2)(l) specifically directs the court's attention to the extent to which the consumer's ability to repay was assessed by the credit provider.
This last issue has a particularly impact on low income consumers. Niven and Gough refer to cases where irresponsible lending and overcommitment has occurred, leading to a declaration that the transaction was unjust. However, the debtor received no real or practical relief because the courts have accepted the principle that, even for an unjust transaction, the debtor must 'bring to account the benefit received', and must repay the principal sum borrowed (Niven and Gough 2004, p. 24) .
Section 72 provides that, on the application of a debtor or guarantor, the court can annul or reduce unconscionable establishment, early termination, and prepayment fees, and unconscionable changes in interest rates. In determining whether a fee is unconscionable, reference can be made to the credit provider's reasonable costs or expected losses (sections 72(3) and 72 (4)).
Section 72 appears to have had little impact on the size of fees in the credit market, with a review of establishment fees over a five year period showing increases greater than would be expected by reference to reasonable establishment costs (Niven and Gough 2004, p. 18) . Providing a creditor's reasonable costs is also likely to be very difficult in practice, and the effect of the provision can be circumvented through payment of excessive commissions and fees to third parties (Niven and Gough 2004, pp18-19) . In addition, even if a fee exceeds reasonable costs or expected losses, it may not be regarded as unconscionable.
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The above discussion highlights some of the key criticisms of the scope and application of the safety net provisions in the UCCC. To a large degree, some or all of the criticisms could be addressed by amendments to the legislation and/or more litigation to confirm the boundaries of the provisions.
However, the effectiveness of safety net provisions also needs to be judged by reference to enforcement issues. Even if the limitations to the scope of the safety net provisions are addressed, the effectiveness of the provisions will be limited if the protections cannot be accessed or enforced in practice.
Impediments to using the safety net provisions
The effectiveness or otherwise of these safety net provisions in the UCCC must be judged by examining enforcement and remedies. As noted above, the provisions in relation to unjust contracts, unconscionable fees, and hardship variations require the affected consumer to institute legal action to take advantage of the rights and protections offered. Thus, for consumers to take advantage of the safety net provisions, they must (i) be aware of the options and (ii) have the necessary financial and personal resources to institute and maintain legal proceedings. However, for low income consumers, there is significant evidence to suggest that both the requisite knowledge and resources are often absent. Each and every one of those transaction is arguably unjust, yet any attempt to curtail such practices is easily circumvented by the practical limitations imposed by s. 70 -only so many consumers are likely to seek assistance or take action on their own account, and in most cases, it will be economically beneficial to the credit provider to resolve each dispute as it arises, rather than to alter those practices (Niven and Gough 2004, p. 25) .
One clear barrier to litigation is a financial one. For many consumer disputes, the costs of litigating would outweigh any potential benefit from successful action. In some states and territories, rights under the UCCC can be exercised in a tribunal (eg Consumer Claims Tribunal in NSW), which has relaxed rules of evidence, discourages legal representation, and has lower filing fees. However, in other jurisdictions (eg Queensland), rights must be pursued through the court system. Even in those jurisdictions with a credit tribunal, consumer applications are still relatively low, and it has been suggested that a legalistic approach by the tribunals effectively requires consumers to have legal representation and thus increases the cost and formality (Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006, p. 290).
The difficulties and costs of legal action are likely to be most prohibitive for consumers on lowincomes. For instance, a UK study demonstrated that low-income consumers are unlikely to take legal action in relation to a loan, given the cost, a sense of powerlessness, and a fear of bitter disputes (Genn 1999, p. 101) . A more recent NSW study of responses to legal problems found that, among a range of civil, criminal and family problems, credit problems were the least likely to result in legal action being taken by disadvantaged consumers (Coumarelos, Wei and Zhou 2006, p. 99) . 4 A further initiative to increase access to justice for consumer disputes, has been the growth of industrybased dispute resolution schemes, including the Financial Ombudsman Service ('FOS'), formed in
2008 from a merger of the three largest dispute resolution schemes. Access to these schemes is free to the consumer, and in making a determination, the Ombudsman must take into account the law, industry codes, good industry practice, and fairness in all the circumstances (Financial Ombudsman Service, Banking and Finance Terms of Reference, clause 7.1).
Disputes raising questions of unjust transactions, or unconscionable fees or interest can be, and are, considered, and adjudicated on by the FOS. However the FOS has ruled that its terms of reference do not allow it to make a variation under sections 66 or 68 of the UCCC. If a credit provider has refused to grant a variation, the role of the FOS will be limited to considering whether the credit provider's process for considering the variation request was appropriate (FOS 2005, p.7) . In addition, there is currently no compulsion for credit providers to join a dispute resolution scheme. Low income consumers are more likely to borrow from non-mainstream lenders, and very few of these lenders have chosen to join a disputes scheme, leaving their customers to pursue disputes through the court system. Finally, research suggests that, for low income consumers in particular, having an adviser to facilitate their access to consumer protection remedies is vital. Studies in New Zealand and Australia have reported that negotiations with credit providers (under a formal hardship proposal or otherwise) are more likely to be successful, and taken more seriously by the creditor, when they are conducted by a financial counsellor or other adviser on the consumer's behalf, rather than the negotiations being conducted by the consumer on their own (eg Anae and Coxon 2007, p.35; Schetzer 2007, pp 39, 42) .
These findings suggest that much more needs to be done to ensure that the rights under the UCCC are of practical assistance to low income consumers.
What our study shows: Do consumers use the safety net provisions?
In addition to the financial and personal resources needed to take action based on safety net provisions, low income consumers also need to be aware of their rights, or at least be able to identify that something is not fair, and then to have access to advice or resources to assess whether a remedy is available, and to pursue those rights. However, a number of studies have suggested that low income and vulnerable consumers often lack knowledge of consumer protection provisions and/or where to turn for redress or assistance (eg Anae and Coxon 2007, p. 17; Kempson and Whyley 1999, p. 31; Schetzer 2007, p. 51) . The results of our qualitative research are consistent with these findings.
General understanding of consumer rights
For example, when asked about their rights as consumers, most participants were only able to focus on the lenders' expectations. Many confused the concepts of rights and responsibilities. For instance, one woman commented that she had the right 'to do the right thing, to pay them'.
Some people realised they had rights in relation to privacy legislation but seemed unsure of the specifics:
Probably privacy, something like that. Privacy. And what else? I don't know other things.
Some people repeated what was in the contract, without seeming to understand what it meant in relation to their rights:
I'll be honest with you, I haven't gone right through it as yet … [The financial institution] is bound by the code of practice for providing a service to you.
Many borrowers from fringe lenders realised that they had grasped at anything offered and as a result felt that the lender had more rights:
[I borrowed from a fringe lender] because I gambled it. I'm a gambler and sometimes it gets me into a real lot of trouble…. My rights and [the fringe lenders'] rights -it's all [the fringe lenders] rights, nothing to do with my rights.
Many assumed that they would forfeit their rights if they defaulted, but seemed confident that would not happen. They did not consider the possibility of a crisis.
I don't necessarily read the contracts, but I know I'm going to make the payments so I don't worry about the consequences because I'm going to make sure I don't default … If you don't default you will be protected.
Overall, low-income participants did not understand, or even know of, their rights under the UCCC or the ramifications of not repaying a loan.
Understanding of rights in the event of hardship
In addition to being asked about their rights as consumers, participants were asked whom they would approach to discuss a payment problem.
Some suggested they would approach legal aid or local community legal centres: Others suggested friends or family members. This suggests there is the risk of inaccurate advice if people rely too heavily on family and friends.
Participants were also asked to reflect on any legal rights they might have in the event of hardship. Noone mentioned that a court could vary a contract, or re-open a contract on the borrower's application, suggesting that many low-income people do not understand their rights. Most suggested that they would approach the lender, however many considered that they had limited bargaining power:
You go to a solicitor, the solicitor will fight for you. But you are not definitely going to win.
Most intuitively felt that speaking to the lender was the right approach:
I guess it would be the manager there, but I guess if they've got this kind of set up then you're really not supported anyway, are you, they just do whatever they want. So I don't know.
Overall, people's limited networks for advice on legal contracts made it difficult for them to understand their rights.
Recognising potentially unfair terms
The research also sought to understand whether low income consumers might identify, and be likely to challenge, a potentially unfair situation, in particular, an unfair term in a credit contract.
Research participants were therefore presented with a one-page summary of the contract (for bank and credit cooperative borrowers) or a mock unfair contract (fringe lending borrowers). These documents included a number of clauses that have been identified as unfair by consumer advocates. One such clause was an 'acceleration' clause: 'If you fail to make a payment when it falls due, the lender will give you 30 days to pay and will then be entitled to demand repayment of the full loan amount'. While this is a standard term of credit contracts, it does not make clear borrowers' rights under section 84 UCCC to be served with a notice of default, with a certain period to remedy the default before the acceleration clause can operate.
Most participants reflected that the clause made them feel powerless, afraid and vulnerable. A customer of a fringe lender was aware that she had given the lender this right but felt so desperate to obtain the money that she had signed anyway:
I remember them saying that if I don't pay, if you miss one payment, well they can demand that you pay the whole lot out… [I would have felt] terrified. Petrified that I'm going to get a letter or a phone call saying, 'Excuse me, but you defaulted on the loan and we want the money straight away.'
A minority of participants felt the acceleration clause was reasonable because they were so committed to repaying and confident they would not end up in a position of default: It is also standard for the credit provider to have the power to vary the terms of the contract. The summary contract and mock unfair contract included the term: 'The terms of this loan may be varied by the lender without your consent.' This is subject to the rights of borrowers under sections 59, 60 and 63 of the UCCC to receive notice before some types of changes are made. Interviewees were unaware of the right to seek a variation of the contract, and were certainly unaware of any rights to be given notice of the change.
Most participants commented on the power imbalance inherent in the lender's ability to make changes without their consent:
How can you make a contract … making it legal to change anything we like within the contract? Is that a contract? That's double-dutch. The reason for a contract is so it can't be changed … That's like fingers behind your back and crossing them, telling lies. It's crazy … Well why can't I change it then? Why doesn't it say either party, for instance? That would be fair; I'm all right with that.
Although increased repayments would have been difficult to manage, another woman had resigned herself to being powerless. She had borrowed from a fringe lender because she had limited options. She accepted this as her lot in life:
That would be a problem. During a loan in particular-like if you're actually paying it off at the time and all of a sudden it went bang, up a bit higher from what it was the previous week for example: it'd be a shock wouldn't it? … I suppose you have less options, it's less options obviously because your income is low … I suppose I do know that with these kinds of loans, because they are easy, you probably are going to have stuff like this in your contract.
Only one man (another community loan borrower) felt confident to challenge the lender. Across all aspects of his life, this man was determined that no-one would 'get the better' of him. This was an attitude, not a capacity which could easily develop through consumer protections:
Well they'd have to consult me first and say they want to alter the contract … if some unusual circumstances cropped up and they said they were going to have to change this-something reasonable-I'd just say fair enough. But if they put something outrageous out I'd say forget it, I just wouldn't pay it, you know ….
In contrast to most participants, one woman very carefully read the contract and understood it. To her, the contract was sufficiently threatening and 'off-putting' for her to decide not to proceed with the loan:
I don't want to be locked into something that could change at somebody else's whim, and being on a pension and getting paid fortnightly, 30 days is only two pays to me, so it's only two pays' notice. I just don't like the idea of somebody being in that much control. I like to be in control myself.
However, most other participants did not like the terms in the contract, but felt that their options were so limited that they made the decision to take the risk and proceed.
Overall, these findings suggest that low income consumers may recognise potentially unfair terms in contracts, particularly when their attention is drawn to those terms specifically, or the terms are highlighted, rather than embedded in a long contract. However, even if they recognise a potential unfairness, the propensity of low income consumers to take action, or even to make enquiries, in relation to potential unfair terms or unjust contracts is likely to be limited. When combined with their limited understanding of consumer rights and remedies, this suggests that safety net provisions are likely to be of limited practical use to the group most likely to be in need of them.
Discussion
Consumer credit law in Australia is largely based on a 'truth-in-lending' model. Lenders have to disclose contract terms, to inform consumers and enable them to shop around, compare products and select the most appropriate product. In this way, it is anticipated that disclosure will facilitate competition among credit providers. It is fundamental to this model that consumers behave in an economically rational way, with their own financial self-interest at heart. There is also an expectation that disclosure will ensure that consumers understand their rights and responsibilities.
However, psychology and behavioural economic theory suggest that emotional and other imperatives often take over from economically rational behaviour. People are not driven solely by rationality, but are also influenced by a range of emotional forces, biases and choices that fall outside of their conscious awareness. (See for example the discussion in Howells 2005 and Willis 2008.) Qualitative research with 30 low income consumers in Melbourne, Victoria emphasises the limitations of a disclosure model of regulation. The research found that, for these participants, emotions were often more important than the economics of the transaction or the notion of an economically rational decision. These emotions included desperation for the money and the humiliation of admitting an inability to understand. For some; the contract was secondary to the emotional work of admitting they wanted something from another party. There was also the pragmatic realisation that for a person on a low-income, options in the market for credit were limited and therefore it was pointless to try to understand the contract. They realised that the choice to go elsewhere or negotiate did not exist for them. They simply needed to take what they could get.
Participants demonstrated that the language and length of documents were also barriers to understanding contracts. In this sense, the disclosure regulatory regime discriminates against less uneducated and more vulnerable consumers.
Borrowers' capabilities were also important. Many admitted to just not having the literacy levels, experience in financial markets or access to advice to be able to understand the contract. As a result, they chose to take the risk and proceed with the hope that the lender would have their best interests at heart. In this connection, the Productivity Commission has recently recommended that disclosure be 'layered' and that initially only key information, necessary to assist the consumer in making a decision as to whether or not to proceed, should be provided at the pre-contractual disclosure stage with additional information available by right on request. It has also recommended that documents should be tested with consumers (Productivity Commission 2008, p. 269).
Overall, the study found that current pre-contractual disclosure documents (primarily the proposed contract) did not help participants to understand many of the important terms of the contract, or to know their rights. Instead, emotions and prejudices had a greater influence on their understanding of the contract terms, and their rights and responsibilities.
Participants' comments generally contradicted the fundamental assumption of the UCCC that disclosure enables borrowers to make an informed choice about signing a credit contract. These participants suggest that disclosure alone is not adequate to protect vulnerable consumers.
However, the UCCC is not only about disclosure. Provisions giving consumers rights to take legal action to challenge an unjust transaction, or an unconscionable fee or charge; and to seek a variation to their contract on the grounds of hardship, have also been included in the UCCC. It was anticipated that these provisions would operate as a safety net, giving vulnerable consumers redress in the event that disclosure and a competitive credit market does not prevent credit providers from engaging in unfair or inappropriate practices.
The scope and application of these safety net provisions has been criticised on a number of grounds.
While some of these concerns could be addressed by legislative amendment, a more fundamental criticism is that the safety net provisions rely on individual consumers to take action to activate the protections offered. There is no scope for regulators to institute proceedings on behalf of one or more affected consumers. This has particular impact on low income and vulnerable consumers, who face considerable practical and personal barriers to initiating legal action.
The qualitative research described in this paper also indicates that these provisions may be of limited, if any, practical assistance to low income consumers. The research participants demonstrated difficulty in understanding their consumer rights. They were unaware of any specific rights provided under the UCCC, and were unsure who to approach to obtain advice.
Many participants had not understood that the contract they signed gave the lender the right to vary terms and to accelerate the obligation to repay. Once they understood these rights they generally felt powerless and vulnerable. Even where they identified a contractual term as unfair or concerning, most participants were resigned to the contract being heavily weighted in favour of the credit provider, and gave no indication that they would challenge such a term in a future contract. Many participants were unable to advocate for themselves.
It could be argued that competition between providers would reduce the incidence of unfair terms.
However, participants of this project showed that their options were too limited to shop around for contracts with more appropriate terms. They also did not have the capacity to understand terms when they were embedded in a lengthy document, as is usually the case. In any case, in many sectors, all the relevant providers are likely to have very similar terms (Standing Committee on Law and Justice 2006, pp 13-14).
The study highlights significant problems with the effectiveness, for low income consumers, of both the disclosure focus of the UCCC, and of the safety net provisions. Major changes need to be made if the UCCC is to be of any real benefit to low income consumers. Disclosure requirements, however consumer friendly, are unlikely to ever be sufficient. The need for safety-net provisions in the UCCC remains, and they are particularly important for low income consumers. However, the effectiveness of these provisions has been limited, and this is due to both the scope of the provisions and the fact that they rely on consumer-initiated actions. A detailed review of the scope and application of the provisions is needed, and the impending transfer of responsibility for consumer credit regulation from the States and Territories to the Commonwealth Government provides the opportunity for such a review, albeit perhaps in phase two of the transfer process (Australian Government 2008, p. 3) . At a bare minimum, the provisions should be amended to provide that the regulator can initiate proceedings to invoke the safety net provisions on behalf of one or more consumers. This is a critical change given the findings of consumers' awareness of consumer rights, and the barriers to initiating legal action.
The safety net regime should also be enhanced by the introduction of legislation to prohibit unfair terms in consumer contracts. Legislation to prohibit unfair terms in consumer contracts was introduced (Bright 1999, p. 364) .
The effectiveness of the UTCCR in protecting consumers, and particularly low income consumers, from unfair terms in credit contracts in particular is due in part to the scope of the regulations, with their wide remit, and detailed examples. However, given the considerable barriers to consumer litigation discussed above, it is apparent that a major factor in the success of the UTCCR for consumers across many sectors of the economy is the fact that the OFT has been resourced to take action, and has used those resources in a very proactive manner, including by systemic reviews of contracts in particular sectors, and by reviewing entire contracts, even though a complaint might refer only to one term in a contract (eg, Bright 2000, pp 333-334) . As Bright notes:
It is this energetic administrative action which will lead to a reshaping of mortgage contracts, and the judgments in Falco Finance and Kindlance v Murphy provide the necessary legal underpinning to support this approach (Bright 1999, p. 365 ).
Australia's implementation of an unfair contract terms regime must similarly be accompanied by appropriate resourcing of the regulator(s).
More recently, the UK has introduced new provisions dealing with unfair consumer credit relationships (ss 140A -C Consumer Credit Act 1974 (UK)). These provisions were introduced following concerns that the then existing protections against extortionate credit bargains were not operating effectively Such provisions can complement, rather than replace the need for, prohibitions against unfair terms, and can enhance the protections for vulnerable consumers.
Conclusion
Our research shows that the current provisions of the UCCC are not effective in enabling low income consumers to make informed decisions about consumer credit. Nor are they effective in protecting low income consumers from unfair or inappropriate creditor practices, or facilitating changes to a credit contract in circumstances of financial hardship. Significant changes are needed to the regulatory framework, including changes to the use and format of disclosure documents, changes to give government consumer agencies standing to conduct UCCC proceedings on behalf of consumers, and the introduction of an unfair contract terms regime. A number of these regulatory changes suggested above have been agreed to in principle by the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments, and these commitments must be given full effect in the forthcoming transfer of credit regulation to the Commonwealth. Further, phase two of the transfer should incorporate a broader review of the safety net provisions in particular.
Annexure 4
Mock unfair credit contract
Credit Contract
Between: Credit provider ("we") And: Borrower ("you")
1. From time to time we may: a. change the amount of or basis for calculating any fee or charge, change the interest or fee charging cycle, or both, and, except during any fixed interest rate period of the Loan, change any interest rate margin, any link to a reference interest rate and the basis for calculating interest; b. impose and debit to the Loan Account any new fee or charge; c. change the frequency of repayments; d. change the Loan Account number; e. change the way we describe any reference interest rate; and f. change any other terms and conditions.
2. In the event of default we may terminate this agreement, require payment of all monies then due and owing under this agreement, and exercise our rights over security property provided by you in accordance with clause 13.
3. As continuing security for the payment of all of your debts, liabilities and obligations to us, you grant a security interest to and in favour of us over all of your present or after acquired personal property and proceeds there from.
